Abstract-Alice and Bob want to share a secret key and to communicate an independent message, both of which they desire to be kept secret from an eavesdropper Eve. We study this problem of secret communication and secret key generation when two resources are available -correlated sources at Alice, Bob, and Eve, and a noisy broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. No other resource, in particular, no other channel is available. We are interested in characterizing the fundamental trade-off between the rates of the secret message and secret key. We present an achievable solution based on a separation architecture and prove its optimality under three settings: when Eve's source and channel are degraded versions of Bob's, and either Bob's source or channel is by itself useless in generating a secret key.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fact that a noisy channel can be used as a resource for secure communication was recognized by Wyner in his seminal work "The Wire-tap Channel" [1] where he considered secure communication over degraded broadcast channels [2] . It was generalized by Csiszár and Körner [3] to cover all broadcast channels.
Analogously, Ahlswede and Csiszár [4] and Maurer [5] recognized that dependent source observations available at the terminals can be used as a resource for generating a secret-key (a uniform random variable shared by Alice and Bob which is oblivious to Eve) if the terminals can communicate over a noiseless public channel (which delivers all its input faithfully to all the terminals including the eavesdropper). In [4] , the secret-key capacity of dependent sources was characterized if a one-way noiseless public channel from Alice to Bob and Eve of unconstrained capacity is available. The characterization for the case when there is a constraint on the capacity of the public channel was later found by Csiszár and Narayan [6] as a special case of their results on a class of common randomness generation problems using a helper.
We would also like to note that many authors have contributed to the literature on secret-key generation when a twoway public discussion channel is available (in the context of both the sources and channels) which still remains an open problem in general. However, two-way communication is outside the scope of this short note.
Instead, we focus on scenarios where both secret communication and secret key agreement are desired in the presence of both correlated sources and a (one-way) noisy broadcast channel. This paper builds on our earlier work on secret communication and key generation using both sources and channels in [7] .
We consider the problem where Alice wants to send Bob a message that needs to be kept perfectly (information theoretically) secret from Eve, and in addition, Alice and Bob want to agree on a key that should also be kept perfectly secret from Eve. The only resources available for achieving this are correlated sources at all three parties and a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. Note that we do not assume the availability of a public discussion channel. One motivation for considering this is that in many contexts (e.g. sensor networks), there is no noiseless public channel directly available, and it is not necessarily optimal to realize a noiseless channel from the noisy channel. Thus, one would like to determine conditions under which noiseless channel realizations would or would not be optimal.
We present a separation strategy which converts Alice's noisy broadcast channel into a public and private bit pipe both of which deliver bits input to them faithfully to Bob. Moreover, bits sent over the private bit pipe are perfectly secret from Eve, but there is no secrecy guarantee on the bits sent over the public bit pipe. With the help of these bit pipes, the sources are then used to generate additional secrecy. We show that our separation strategy is optimal in three settings: when Eve's source and channel are degraded versions of Bob's, and either Bob's source or channel is by itself useless in generating a secret key. Our results establish that under certain source and channel conditions, realizing noiseless public and private channels from a noisy broadcast channel is optimal for the communication of both secret key and secret messages.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Notation: We denote random variables by upper-case letters (e.g., X), their realizations by lower-case letters (e.g., x), and the alphabets over which they take values by calligraphic letters (e.g., X ). A vector (X k , X k+1 , . . . , X n ) will be denoted by X n k . When k = 1, the subscript will be dropped as in X n = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ). We make the following assumptions on the channel and sources:
• The channel and the sources are memoryless.
Problem setup: Alice and Bob want to share a key K and independent message M , both of which they want to be kept secret from Eve. Alice has a memoryless broadcast to Bob and Eve, and all three have correlated memoryless sources.
• The channel is independent of the sources.
• The number of source observations is the same as the number of channel uses available. Note that we allow all the sources to be observed ahead of time in the sense that the input to the channel may depend on the block of source observations. The assumption on the number of source observations and channel uses can be easily relaxed and is made here only for reducing the notation. However, the independence assumption is critical to the results we present here. The memoryless assumption is useful for getting simple closed-form singleletter expressions.
We consider the following model. Alice, Bob and Eve observe, respectively, the dependent memoryless processes (sources) S A,k , S B,k , S E,k , where k = 1, 2, . . . is the time index. They have a joint distribution p SA,SB ,SE over the alphabet S A × S B × S E . Independent of these sources, there is a memoryless broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve given by p Y,Z|X , where X k is the input to the channel, Y k is Bob's output, and Z k Eve's. We will also allow Alice to have access to a private random variable Φ A which is not available to Bob and Eve and which is independent of all other random variables. Alice may use this private random variable for purposes of randomization.
For > 0, a random variable U is defined to berecoverable from another random variable V if there is a function f such that Pr(U = f (V )) ≤ . Suppose the parties make n observations of their sources, and Alice sends an nlength input X n to the channel. The input is a function of her observation S n A , the secret message M which is uniformly distributed over its alphabet M and independent of the sources and channel, and the private random variable Φ A available only to Alice. We say that
n , satisfies the secrecy condition
and the uniformity condition
where K is the alphabet over which K takes its values. We define (R SK, , R SM, ) to be an -achievable rate pair if there is an -secret-key K n such that
, and
A rate pair (R SK , R SM ) is said to be achievable if there is a sequence of n such that (R SK, n , R SM, n ) are nachievable rate pairs, and as n → ∞,
We define the rate region R to be the set of all achievable rate pairs.
III. RESULTS
Let P be the set of all joint distributions p of random vari-
and (V 1 , V 2 ) are independent, the following two Markov chains hold
the joint distribution of (S A , S B , S E ) and the joint conditional distribution of (Y, Z) given X are consistent with the given source and channel respectively, and
For p ∈ P, let R(p) be the set of all non-negative pairs (R SK , R SM ) which satisfy the following two inequalities
The next theorem states that all pairs of rates belonging to R(p) are achievable.
Remark: It can be shown that in taking the union above, it suffices to consider auxiliary random variables with a sufficiently large, but finite cardinality. This can be shown using Carathéodery's theorem (see [3] , for instance).
The next theorem states that the above inner bound to the tradeoff region is tight under three different cases. constant and V 1 = X. Then the rate region simplifies to the following: 
Remarks:
• Note that the degradedness conditions above may be relaxed to stochastically degraded conditions. i.e., for instance, in (a), the inner bound is tight as long as there are f and g such that
• Under case (b), the above theorem implies that the optimal strategy involves turning the channel into a public bit-pipe by channel coding, and using this public bitpipe for performing secret communication and secret-key generation from the sources. This is intuitively pleasing, since in this case, the channel resource by itself is incapable of providing any secrecy. Note that we have not covered above all the cases where the channel resource cannot provide any secrecy. This condition is when the channel to Eve is 'less noisy' than the channel to Bob [3, Corollary 3, pg. 341]. Under this condition, the optimality of turning the channel into a public bit-pipe was shown for secret-key generation and in the special case where Eve has no source observation for secret communication in [7] .
• Case (c) corresponds to the setting where given the sources and a public bit-pipe from Alice to Bob and Eve, Alice and Bob cannot generate a positive rate secretkey [4] . In other words, the source resource is incapable of providing any secrecy. Case (c) above simply states that the optimal strategy involves ignoring the sources in this case, and utilizing only the channel. In particular, R(p) is now defined by the condition
where
is a Markov chain. Thus the optimal strategy in this case reduces to that of Csiszár and Körner [3] and there is essentially no distinction between sending a secret message and generating a secret-key.
Proof of Theorem 2:
The proof is available in the full version [8] of this paper and is omitted for want of space.
A Gaussian example:
Let us consider a simple Gaussian example. Suppose the observations of Alice and Bob are jointly Gaussian. Then, without loss of generality, we can model them as
where S A and N source are zero mean Gaussian. Let N source be unit variance, and let the variance of S A be SNR src . Let Eve have no source observation. Suppose that the broadcast channel has additive Gaussian noise with a mean-squared power constraint on X of SNR Bob . Y = X + N Bob , and
where N Bob and N Eve are Gaussians independent of X, and such that N Bob has unit variance and N Eve has a variance SNR Bob /SNR Eve .
Proposition 3. The rate region R for this problem is set of all non-negative (R SK , R SM ) pairs satisfying
Proof: While we stated the Theorems 1 and 2 only for finite alphabets, the results can be extended to continuous alphabets. We note that the scalar Gaussian problem above falls under cases (a) and (b) of Theorem 2 (along with Remark 1 following it). Using entropy power inequality, we show in the full version [8] of this paper that the auxiliary random variables can be chosen to be Gaussian. With this choice, the rate region takes on the form in the proposition. Remark: When Eve also has a source observation jointly Gaussian with the observations of Alice and Bob, the problem is covered by the three cases in Theorem 2. However, unlike in the proposition above, we were unable to show that a Gaussian choice of the auxiliary random variables is sufficient.
A sketch of our scheme follows; the details are available in the full version [8] of this paper.
Sketch of proof of Theorem 1:
We follow a separation strategy. Using the channel, we will first create two bit pipes -a secret bit pipe (SBP) and a public bit pipe (PBP) of rates R SBP and R PBP , respectively, such that bits input to these bit pipes are delivered with small probability of error to Bob. The security guarantee is that if the message sent over the SBP and the message sent over the PBP have mutual information which is o(n), then the mutual information of the SBP message with everything the eavesdropper has access to is also o(n). We state (without proof), the following claim. Claim: For any given joint distribution of random variables
is a Markov chain and the joint conditional distribution of (Y, Z) given X is consistent with the given channel, then using the channel, we may achieve the following (R SBP , R PBP )
We will use the channel interface from the claim above with V 1 , V 2 , X from p. Over the SBP, we will send part of the secret message at rate R SM1 . Any additional rate remaining on the SBP is used to send random coin tosses from Alice's Φ A and bin information from a source coder decribed below, both of which are used as a secret-key; let the rate of this secret key be R SK1 . We use U 1 , U 2 as the auxiliary random variables of a Wyner-Ziv source coder which will use the above mentioned rate, and all of the PBP to do the following: (a) generate a secret-key of rate R SK2 + R SM2 by sending the remainder of the Wyner-Ziv bin information (see the achievability proof of Ahlswede and Csiszár [4] ), and (b) send the remaining part of the secret message at rate R SM2 one-time padded by R SM2 bits of the secret-key generated in stage (a).
We have the following conditions to satisfy:
• The total rate of secret (key + message) we can derive from the secret bits supported by the channel interface is R SBP .
• The total rate of secret (key + message) we derive from the source is at most [I(
• The bin information should fit into its allocated bit budget.
I(U
Let us rewrite this as
• The one-time padded part of the secret message is sent over the PBP, so it should not exceed the PBP rate
• Additionally, the rates R SK1 , R SK2 , R SM1 , R SM2 are nonnegative. To get the rate region R, we write
and eliminate the variables R SK1 , R SK2 , R SM1 , R SM2 from the above (Fourier-Motzkin elimination). This gives the conditions (1) and (2) . Thus, R(p) is achievable.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this work, we have presented a general achievable strategy for secret message and secret key communication from Alice to Bob when Alice, Bob, and Eve share a correlated source and Alice has a noisy broadcast channel to Bob and Eve. We have shown this strategy is optimal when Eve's source and channel are degraded versions of Bob's, as well as for cases in which either Bob's source or channel is by itself useless in generating a secret key. The strategy presented is a separation strategy that converts Alice's noisy broadcast channel into a public and private bit pipes, over which the sources can then be used to provide additional secrecy for both secret key and secret message.
It remains to be seen whether this separation strategy is optimal in general. The answer to this question is the subject of ongoing work.
